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Abstract—Artificial immune systems, more specifically the
negative selection algorithm, have previously been applied to
intrusion detection. The aim of this research is to develop
an intrusion detection system based on a novel concept in
immunology, the Danger Theory. Dendritic Cells (DCs) are
antigen presenting cells and key to the activation of the human
immune system. DCs perform the vital role of combining
signals from the host tissue and correlate these signals with
proteins known as antigens. In algorithmic terms, individual
DCs perform multi-sensor data fusion based on time-windows.
The whole population of DCs asynchronously correlates the
fused signals with a secondary data stream. The behaviour of
human DCs is abstracted to form the DC Algorithm (DCA),
which is implemented using an immune inspired framework,
libtissue. This system is used to detect context switching
for a basic machine learning dataset and to detect outgoing
portscans in real-time. Experimental results show a significant
difference between an outgoing portscan and normal traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Applications which monitor computer systems and net-
works for misuse and abuse are known as intrusion detection
systems (IDS). Misuse based IDSs use pre-defined paths and
patterns of program execution to detect intrusions, but are
blind to novel or variant attacks. Anomaly based intrusion
detection systems on the other hand generate profiles of
‘normal’ behaviour [7] [10]. Deviations from normal are
classed as ‘anomalous’ and an alert is generated providing
notification of a potential intrusion. Anomaly based systems
can produce large amounts of false alarms (false positives),
largely caused by the lack of environmental awareness or
context. This paper focuses on the development of a contex-
tually aware IDS, built on a foundation of immune inspired
components.
A variety of machine learning techniques has been ap-
plied to anomaly detection, including neural networks and
statistical learning algorithms [7]. Artificial Immune Systems
(AIS), based on the functioning of the human immune sys-
tem, have also been applied to anomaly detection. In 1999,
Hofmeyr [10] developed an artificial immune system based
on ‘negative selection’: detectors forming the normal profile
are deleted if they match a string denoting normal behaviour.
At the time, it was perceived to function in a similar way to
the selection of T-lymphocyte cells in the thymus. Problems
with negative selection were highlighted by Kim & Bentley
[12] and more recently by Stibor et al [16]. Aickelin et
al [4] proposed that the negative selection algorithm could
not work because it was based on a simplified version
of the immunological self-nonself theory. This theory has
been challenged within immunology itself and an alternative
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theory has been proposed - the Danger Theory [13]. The
Danger Theory states that the immune system does not
discriminate on the basis of self or nonself, but on the balance
between the concentration of danger and ‘safe’ signals within
the tissue of the body. The work described in this paper is the
application of danger theory ideas to anomaly based intrusion
detection.
It is our hypothesis that the inclusion of more biologically
realistic features alleviates some of the scaling problems and
reduces the amount of false alerts generated by negative
selection based systems. In this paper we propose and test
an algorithm based on the behaviour of DCs, who are
major players in the danger theory. DCs are responsible for
combining signals in the tissue and informing the immune
system of any changes in signal concentration. We have used
an abstraction of DC behaviour to develop the DCA. In
this paper, we demonstrate the application of the DCA to
two problems - a static machine learning problem and a
computer security related real-time problem. This work is
an extension of concepts and experiments described in [8].
We verify the correctness of the algorithm’s implementation,
and present experiments demonstrating real-time anomaly
detection properties of the DCA. Further experiments are
required to demonstrate the DCA’s effectiveness as an an
anomaly detector in other domains.
In this paper, Section II contains background information
describing the biological basis for the new algorithm and
information on the development of AIS for IDS; Section III
briefly describes the DCA; Section IV outlines experiments
performed on a static dataset, complete with results; Section
V contains experimental details from testing the algorithm
in a pre-intrusion scenario; Section VI contains results and
analysis of the intrusion experiment; and finally, Section VII
provides conclusions and future directions.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to describe the algorithm it is first necessary to
explain some of the biological concepts used and to place
these concepts in context within the field of artificial immune
systems. The biological basis for the functioning of DCs has
been described in detail in our previous work [8]. Subsequent
sections explain the relevance of the danger theory to the
DCA and how this can be applied to intrusion detection.
A. The Rise and Fall of Self-Nonself
Until relatively recently the human immune system was
thought to discriminate between antigens (proteins) be-
longing to ‘self’ versus antigens belonging to pathogens -
‘non-self’. The self-nonself theory relies on the expression
of antigen-recognising receptors present on T-lymphocytes.
These receptors are matched against self antigen during a
training period in the thymus, resulting in the deletion of cells
with the potential to interact with self antigens. Recently,
several questions have been raised regarding the validity
of this model as a central tenet. What is defined as ‘self’
actually changes throughout the lifetime of an individual, e.g.
a pregnant woman’s immune system does not react against
her unborn foetus despite consisting of ‘nonself’ proteins.
A modification to the self-nonself theory was proposed by
Janeway [11], namely the ‘infectious non-self’ model. This
states that an antigen must be associated with a PAMP
(pathogen associated molecular patterns) in order to trigger a
response, as recognised by the innate immune system. While
this model could explain the rationale for adding stimulatory
adjuvants to vaccines, it could still not answer pertinent
questions relating to autoimmunity (e.g. Multiple Sclerosis).
The Danger Theory [13] provides an alternative view of
the activation of the immune system. Unlike the detection of
non-self antigens or pathogenic molecules, the danger model
proposes that the immune system detects the presence of
danger signals, released as a result of necrotic cell death
within the host tissue. Necrosis is the result of cellular dam-
age and stress caused by pathogenic infection or exposure to
extreme conditions. The metabolites of internal cell compon-
ents are thought to form the danger signals and are released
into the surround buffer fluid. The cell membrane loses its
integrity, releasing its contents (e.g. DNA, mitochondria) into
the surrounding tissue fluid [14]. The Danger Theory pro-
poses that the immune system is sensitive to changes in the
danger signal concentration in the tissue. Conversely, when
then tissue is healthy, cells die in a controlled manner, known
as apoptosis. Immunosuppressive molecules (safe signals) are
released as an indicator of normality in the tissue. In essence,
the Danger Theory consists of active suppression while the
tissue is healthy (apopotosis), combined with rapid activation
on receipt of necrotic danger signals. This property can be
abstracted to form artificial tissue, as conceptualised in a
software framework in [17] or used for data representation
in [6].
DC’s first function is to reside in tissue, where they
are classed as ‘immature’. Whilst in tissue, DCs collect
antigen (regardless of the source) and experience danger
signals from necrosing cells and ‘safe’ signals from apoptotic
cells. Maturation of DCs occurs in response to the receipt
of these signals. On maturation, DC exhibit the following
behaviour: collection of antigen ceases; expression of co-
stimulatory molecules (necessary for binding to powerful T-
lymphocytes) and chemical messengers known as cytokines;
migration from the tissue to a lymphatic organ such as a
lymph node; and presenting antigen to T-lymphocytes. The
context of the tissue (i.e. the type of signals experienced)
is reflected in the output chemicals of the DC. If there is a
greater concentration of danger signals in the tissue at the
time of antigen collection, the DC will become fully mature
(mDC), and will express mDC cytokines. Conversely, if the
DC is exposed to ‘safe’ signals, the cell matures differently
becoming a semi-mature DC, expressing smDC cytokines
[15]. The mDC cytokines activate T-lymphocytes expressing
complimentary receptors to the presented antigen. Any peri-
pheral cells expressing that antigen type are removed through
the activated T-lymphocyte. The smDC cytokines suppress
the activity of any matching T-cell, inducing tolerance to
the presented antigen. The context of the antigen is assessed
based on the resulting cytokine expression of the DC. In
our model, a combination of Janeway’s Infectious Non-self
(PAMPs) model with Matzinger’s Danger model (signals) is
used to investigate an artificial DC algorithm.
B. AIS: The Story So Far
Similarly to immunology, AIS initially relied on self-
nonself principles to create algorithms such as negative
selection and the B-cell based clonal expansion. Negative
selection has been used extensively for the purpose of
intrusion detection [5], with numerous variations for antigen
representation. The algorithm described in [10] is used to
generate a normal profile based on a detector set. In their
work, network connections established by host machines are
monitored and mapped onto a schema for matching. Their
model uses a training period in which common connections
are deleted from the detector set based on an activation
threshold. Once the training period is finished, the detectors
are compared against new connections. Connections with a
sufficiently high match count to a particular detector are
classed as an anomaly and an alert is generated. This al-
gorithm has been criticised for problems with false positives
and scaling. False positives arise because the nature of a
machine’s connections can change over time as part of
normal behaviour. As the detectors are not dynamically re-
trained, once a connection rate threshold is set, any change in
the behaviour of the machine results in the AIS responding to
a seemingly anomalous connection. An additional problem
is detector generation. Initially, the values for the detectors
are created at random. As the size of the connection space
increases, the size of the random detector set grows at
an unsustainable rate. This criticism has been theoretically
validated by the work of Stibor et al [16].
While this algorithm advanced the development of AIS
by stimulating further work in this field, it also hindered
development by inspiring other algorithms to be based on
similar, simplistic views of immunology. The Danger Project,
initially proposed in 2003, aims to improve on the results
of negative selection based IDSs by re-thinking the use of
immunology within AIS. The work presented in this paper
is the implementation of ideas outlined in this proposal [4].
III. THE DC ALGORITHM AND libtissue
A. The DC Algorithm
DCs have a number of functional properties that can
be abstracted to form a useful algorithm. The abstraction
process, algorithm and a worked example of the signal
processing methods are described in detail in our previous
work [8]. Outlined below are the key characteristics of DC
behaviour used to generate the DCA:
• Immature DCs (iDC) collect multiple antigens and are
exposed to signals in the tissue.
• DCs can combine signals from multiple sources to gen-
erate different output concentrations of costimulatory
molecules, semi-mature cytokines and mature cytokines.
• Exposure to signals generates an increase in co-
stimulatory molecules, with a high amount leading to
migration to the lymph node.
• Exposure to signals causes the maturation of DCs into
either mature and semi mature states, assessed through
the differences in concentration of mature and semi-
mature cytokines.
For the purpose of this model, a simple interpretation of
the input signals has been derived. There are four signals
in our model, each from a different source and producing
different output cytokines:
• PAMPS (P) are based on pre-defined signatures. Expos-
ure to PAMPS causes an increase in mDC cytokines.
PAMPs are suppressed by safe signals.
• Danger signals (D) cause an increase in mDC cytokines.
Danger Signals can also be suppressed by safe signals.
Danger signals have a lower potency than PAMPs.
• Safe signals (S) cause an increase in smDC cytokines
and have a suppressive effect on both PAMPS and
danger signals.
• Inflammatory cytokines (IC) amplify the effects of the
other three signals, but are not sufficient to cause any
effect on DCs when used in isolation.
Our data and method of processing is very different from
other AIS, which rely on pattern matching of antigen to
drive their systems, e.g. [19]. In our algorithm, antigen is
only used for the labelling and tracking of data, hence we
do not have a similarity metric. The representation of the
antigen can be a string of either integers or characters.
Signals are represented as real-valued numbers, proportional
to values derived from the context information of the dataset
in use. For example, a danger signal may be an increase
in CPU usage of a computer. The value for the CPU load
can be normalised within a range and converted into its
real-valued signal concentration value. The signal values
are combined using a weighted function (Equation 1) with
suggested values of the weights derived from empirical data
based on immunologists’ wet lab results (Dr Julie McLeod,
Dr Rachel Harry and Charlotte Williams - University of the
West of England).
The function itself is a weighted sum of PAMP, danger
and safe signal concentration values, multiplied by a value
for inflammation (in the range of 0 and 2). The resulting
value is then normalised through division by the sum of
the weights. The function is used three times to calculate
the output cytokines of costimulatory molecules (CSMs),
mDC and smDC cytokines, as denoted. C represents a
concentration, with the subscript denoting the cytokine or
signal it represents (P,D, S, IC are PAMP, danger, safe
and inflammatory signals). Similarly, W corresponds to the
weights used. These values are updated each time a DC is
exposed to signals, which influence the state of the DC:
immature or mature, with immature being the initial, default
state for the cells. Transition to the mature state is facilitated
through the CSM value. Each cell is assigned an individual
migration CSM threshold value, which can vary between
cells should it be required. When a cell’s CSM value exceeds
the migration threshold, the status of the cell changes and
migration from the tissue is initiated.
C[csm,mDCi,smDC] =
((WP ∗CP )+(WS∗CS)+(WD∗CD))
(WP+WS+WD)
∗ 1+IC2
(1)
TABLE I
WEIGHTS FOR THE SIGNAL PROCESSING FUNCTION
W csm semi mat
PAMPs(P) 2 0 2
Danger Signals(D) 1 0 1
Safe Signals (S) 2 3 -3
The DCA is a population based algorithm, with a user
defined number of DCs created to form a sampling pool.
While in the sampling pool, each DC is exposed to current
signal values and selects a slot in the antigen store. If an
antigen is present in the antigen store, the DC collects the
antigen and ingests it in the DC internal antigen storage.
Each DC has the opportunity to sample multiple antigens. For
every iteration of antigen collection, each DC re-calculates its
internal cytokine values based on the input signals received.
Each antigen can be sampled single or multiple times (a
tunable parameter).
Migration is simulated by the removal of a DC from the
pool and occurs when the cell’s internal CSM value exceeds
the DC’s migration threshold. At this point, the output
cytokines of each DC are measured. Antigen presented by
cells predominantly expressing mature cytokines is labelled
‘mature context antigen’, whilst antigen from cells expressing
predominantly semi-mature cytokines is labelled as ‘semi-
mature’. Each presented antigen’s context is recorded and
eventually a mean antigen context value (between 0 and 1)
is derived. Further details of the DCA can be found in [8].
B. System Integration
libtissue [17] is a software system which allows the
implementation and testing of AIS algorithms on real-world
computer security problems. Its design comes from detailed
research into innate immunology [18] and computer security.
It allows researchers to implement AIS algorithms as a
collection of cells, antigen and signals, interacting within a
tissue compartment. Input data to the tissue compartment
comes in the form of real-time events generated by sensors
monitoring a system under surveillance. Cells are actively
able to affect the monitored system through response mech-
anisms, though none are relevant to the DCA.
The system has a client/server architecture pictured in
Figure 1. The AIS algorithm is implemented as a libtissue
server, while libtissue clients provide input data to the al-
gorithm and provide response mechanisms. This client/server
architecture separates data collection by the libtissue
clients from data processing by the libtissue servers.
Client and server APIs exist, allowing new antigen and signal
sources to be easily added to libtissue servers, and the
testing of the same algorithm with a number of different
data sources. Client/server communication is socket-based
and uses the SCTP protocol, allowing clients and servers to
potentially run on separate machines, for example a signal
client may in fact be a remote network monitor.
libtissue clients are of three types: antigen, signal
and response. Antigen clients collect data and transform it
into antigen which are forwarded to a libtissue server.
Currently, a systrace antigen client has been implemented
which collects process system calls using systrace [3]. Sys-
tem calls are a low-level mechanism by which applications
request system services such as peripheral I/O or memory
allocation from an operating system. Signal clients monitor
system behaviour and provide the AIS with input signals.
A process signal client, which monitors a process and its
children and records statistics such as CPU and memory
usage, and a network signal client, which monitors network
interface statistics such as bytes per second, have also
been implemented. Currently, response clients which directly
modify a systrace system call policy and generate alerts are
also implemented. These clients are designed to be used
in real-time experiments and for data collection for offline
experiments.
The implementation is designed to allow varied AIS
algorithms to be evaluated on real-world systems and
problems[17]. When testing IDSs it is common to use preex-
isting datasets such as the Lincoln Labs dataset [1]. However,
our project is focused on combining measurements from a
number of different concurrent data sources. Pre-existing data
sets are not available containing the necessary data for our
system. To facilitate experimentation, a replay client has also
been implemented. This client reads in log files gathered
from previous real-time runs of antigen and signal clients. It
also has the facility to read logfiles generated by strace [2] as
an optional source of antigen in place of the systrace client. It
then sends these logs to a libtissue server. Variable replay
rates are available, allowing data collected from a real-time
session to be used to perform many experiments quickly.
The libtissue server itself provides a programming
environment in which AIS algorithms can be implemented.
Input data for these algorithms comes from data sources
provided by connected libtissue clients and is represented
in a tissue compartment. A tissue compartment is a space
in which cells, signals and antigen interact. Each tissue
compartment has a fixed-size antigen store where antigen
provided by libtissue clients is placed. The tissue com-
partment also stores levels of signals, set either by signal
tissue clients or cells.
libtissue cells, like tissue compartments, have antigen
and signal stores. They also have a number of different
receptors and producers which allow cells to interact with
others cells, antigen and signals in the tissue compartment.
Currently, four types of receptors have been implemented:
antigen, cytokine, cell and vr receptors. Antigen receptors
allow cells to transfer antigen from the tissue compartment
to their own internal antigen store. Cytokine receptor allow
cells to read signal levels in the compartment. Cell receptors
allow cells to bind to other cells. Binding is necessary for vr
receptors, which match antigen presented on another cell, to
be activated. Antigen from a cell’s internal store are presented
on antigen producers, one of the three types of producers
currently implemented. The other two types, cytokine and
response producers, allow cells to change cytokine levels
in the tissue compartment and communicate with response
clients respectively.
antigen
response
signal
antigen store
signal store
compartment
cells
clients server
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Fig. 1. libtissue System Architecture
IV. WISCONSIN BREAST CANCER DATA
Previous work with the DCA included preliminary ex-
periments using the Wisconsin Breast Cancer dataset [9] to
form the signals and antigen, and produced class switching
behaviour in the DCs. Here we repeat and extend these
experiments to verify the implementation of the DCA within
the libtissue framework [8].
The Wisconsin Breast Cancer dataset [9] consists of 700
items: 240 items in class 0, 460 in class 1 and with each data
item containing nine normalised attributes. The static nature
of the dataset enables testing for detection accuracy and
provides two different data contexts which can be ‘replayed’.
Although we are aware that using static data to test an
intrusion detection algorithm is not ideal, it nevertheless
provides a predictable test-bed for examining the algorithm
itself. The antigen context output of the DCA classifies the
data into class 0 or class 1. This value is then compared
against the original classification and the number of errors
recorded.
A. Signals and Antigen
In our experiments, five out of the nine attributes are
used to form the signals. The five attributes with the largest
standard deviation are chosen. Cell shape, bare nuclei and
normal nucleoli are danger signals. Clump size has the
highest standard deviation out of all attributes and is used
to calculate PAMP and safe signal values for each data item.
The PAMP and safe signal value equals the deviation from
the mean of the class [8].
The signal concentration values are accumulated and pro-
cessed within each DC using the weighted signal processing
function described in Section III. Weightings used for this
experiment are derived from empirical immunology and are
shown in Table 1. The total signal values form the basis of
discrimination for the detection of context changes in the
original data.
In this experiment we have not included values for in-
flammatory cytokines, as no suitable mapping exists. Antigen
provides a label for each data item. A migration threshold for
removal from the sampling pool is implemented. Once this
threshold is exceeded, a DC is removed from the sampling
pool and its antigen plus context is written in a log file.
Once all the data items are processed the log file is analysed.
The number of ‘mature’ and ‘semi-mature’ presentations per
antigen is calculated. Ultimately, a mean value is calculated
from the context data. A threshold reflecting the distribution
of the original data is used to discern between antigens
presented in a class 0 or class 1 context. Values exceeding
the threshold are categorised as class 1.
B. Tissue Clients and Parameters
In this experiment, a tissue client is used to convert the
dataset from a text file into a data-stream structure. These
values are represented as signal concentrations and are passed
to the tissue server. Parameters are chosen to provide similar
conditions as used in previous work [8]. A summary of the
parameters used is shown in Table II.
TABLE II
TISSUE SERVER PARAMETER SETTINGS
Parameter Breast Cancer Expts Port Scan Expts
Tissue antigen capacity 1 antigen 500 antigen
Cell antigen capacity 50 antigen 50 antigen
Number of DCs in pool 100 DCs 500 DCs
Antigen sampling probability 0.10 1.00
Signal decay rate 100% 100%
Cell cycle rate 1 sample/s 1 sample/s
Number of times a single 10 1
antigen is sampled
C. Experiments
Two series of experiments are performed using the cancer
dataset, with all experiments performed on a Debian Linux
machine (kernel 2.4.10, AMD Athlon 1GHz). All code is
implemented in C (gcc 4.0.2). Each experiment is performed
20 times, with 7000 antigen collected per run. The context
values from each run are used to derive an overall mean
context value for each antigen. A threshold of 0.65 (reflective
of the class distribution of the dataset) is used to determine
the final class label of each antigen. Antigen with context
values of over 0.65 are designated class 1 and vice versa.
Experimental series 1 explores the class-switching beha-
viour of the DCs by investigating the influence of the data
order. Three data orders are explored: class 0 followed by
class 1 (one-step); the first half of class 0, all of class
1, followed by the remainder of class 0 (two-step); and a
random distribution. A further experiment is performed using
the two-step data order where each antigen is sampled only
once, not 10 times as in previous experiments. The migration
threshold for each DC is generated randomly within the range
of 5-15 (mean value of 10).
The series 2 experiments use the one-step data order to
assess the effect of changing the migration threshold value.
The migration threshold value limits the amount of antigen
a DC can collect. A larger migration threshold increases
the sampling window size for antigen collection. We are
interested to see what effect variations of this value have on
the amount of errors produced by the system. The migration
threshold is fixed at 1, 5, 10, 15 and compared to the
previously used random number within the range of 5-15.
Each experiment is run 20 times with the context values for
each antigen derived from the mean of all runs.
D. The Results
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Fig. 2. The experiment shown features a one step data order (n=20). The
data set contains 240 data items of class 0 followed by 460 class 1 items.
The context switching of DCs is demonstrated in accordance with change
in the data.
The results from series 1 are shown in Figure 2 and in
Table III. Figure 2 shows the class switching behaviour of the
DCs from class 0 to class 1 in line with the data order. These
results produce comparable trends with previous results[8].
However, there is some loss of accuracy as seen from the
increased amount of errors listed in Table III. This is due
to the addition of new components in libtissue, such
as antigen overwriting and random selection of cells in the
update cycle of the DCs. When each antigen is sampled once,
the results for the 2-step experiment improve as shown in
Table III. This is due to the strong linkage between antigen
and signals in this experimental set-up. As expected when
the data order is completely random the performance of the
algorithm is poor, due to the lack of linkage between antigen
and signals.
TABLE III
NUMBER OF ERRORS FOR EACH DATA ORDER
Data Order Number of Errors
1-step 57
2-step 133
Random 349
2-step (single Ag sample) 4
The results from series 2 are presented in Table IV.
The results show that variation in the migration threshold
significantly alters the classification of data items (using a
paired t-test, p < 0.01) around the class-switch boundary.
Analysis based on the number of errors suggests that CSM=1
is the best value for the threshold. However, the magnitude of
the errors generated using CSM=1 (error values not reported)
is greater than those reported when CSM=5, making CSM=5
a more suitable value. The variable threshold was expected
to perform within the same range as CSM=10, being the
mean of the random range. However, the number of errors
produced using CSM=variable was smaller than expected
and significantly different to the results from CSM=10. The
variable threshold adds robustness to the system; furthermore
a set value need not be specified, as long as the values fall
within a sensible range.
TABLE IV
NUMBER OF ERRORS FOR EACH DATA ORDER
Migration Threshold Number of Errors
1 14
5 41
10 83
15 182
Variable 57
V. PORT SCAN EXPERIMENTS
Port scanning is used primarily for network administration
and consists of sending packets to machines for the purpose
of understanding the topography of a network. However, this
tool is often used for malicious purposes to search out vul-
nerable machines. Detection of port scans is a key step in the
detection of an attack and makes an ideal small scale, real-
time experiment for testing the DCA. An essential purpose
of this experiment is to ensure the tissue server, clients and
algorithm can cope with real-time data processing.
A. The ICMP scan
The port scan used is a ping (ICMP) scan performed across
a range of IP-addresses, using the nmap tool. In order to
perform this port scan, a remote shell (via ssh on a selected
port, 2222) is established, from which nmap is executed,
providing an example of anomalous behaviour. To capture
normal behaviour, a file transfer is performed from the host
machine to another, in addition to ssh demon processes and
shells running in the background. The port scan and the
file transfer are not performed simultaneously, to allow for
a baseline of comparison. Four different experiments are
performed varying the combinations of the different signals
and the safe signal weighting for the mature cytokine value.
The protocol describing the port scan procedure is as follows:
• Remotely log-in to host using ssh port 2222
• Run the nmap (nmap -sP), ICMP scanning over 1000
IP addresses
• Wait for 30 seconds
• Transfer a file from the host machine (3.3MB)
• Close the remote session
B. Signals and Antigen
Process IDs from all processes running through the remote
shell are captured using a systrace tissue client, as described
in Section III. The process IDs are the antigen of the system
and are classed as either ‘semi-mature’ or ‘mature’ dependent
on the percentage of DCs expressing an antigen with mature
cytokines. The proportion of mature context antigen (per
process) are used to identify misbehaving processes. This
context is generated by exposing the DCs to various signals
representative of machine behaviour. Signals have been se-
lected to reflect a network based attack. An ‘ideal’ PAMP
would be a signature or definite indicator of a pathogenic
presence. In this instance the number of ICMP ‘destination
unreachable’ errors are converted into PAMP signals. These
signals are generated if a scanned IP address does not have
an associated machine - a potential sign of port scanning.
The amount of packets transmitted per second is measured
and forms the danger signals. The higher the amount of
packets per second, the greater the concentration of the
danger signal. The safe signals are viewed as the opposite of
danger signals. Safe signals are derived from the inverse rate
of change of packets per second, based on a moving average
over a 2 second time window.
Inflammatory signals are reflective of the machine beha-
viour in general, but not specific to the scan. In this instance,
the inflammatory signal was set to zero to indicate ‘user
present’ or set to 1 to simulate ‘user absent’. This is based
on the assumption that it is less likely to comply as normal
data should a port scan take place without a user present
at the machine. An example of the incoming signals to the
tissue server is shown in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. The PAMPs, danger signal and safe signal inputs.
C. Parameters, Settings and Scripts
The parameters used in this experiment are shown in Table
II. All experiments were performed using nmap version 3.2.1
on an AMD Athlon machine (1GHZ) running Debian Linux
kernel version 2.6.10. OpenSSH version 4.2 was used for the
remote shell, with all code written in C (gcc version 4.0.2).
Signal collection scripts are written in bash to extract relevant
data from the /proc file system, in addition to the use of
the netstat program. These samples were taken once per
second. Each experiment was performed ten times, with the
mean percentage of mature antigen calculated to assess the
anomalous or normal nature of the individual processes. A
process monitor script is used to capture which processes
have run throughout the course of the experiment for the
purpose of antigen identification. Forked or child process IDs
are also captured.
Experiments with the port-scan tissue clients are per-
formed using different combinations of signals. A summary
of the experiments is detailed in Table V. As PAMPs did not
feature in experiment 1, the weighting for the transformation
of safe signals to CSMs was changed from -3 to -1. In these
experiments all other weighting values are as described in
Table I. This weighting was increased to -2 for experiments
3 and 4 to explore the relationship between detection of
normal processes and an increase in safe signal suppression.
In experiment 4, the inflammatory signal was used for the
first time, to assess the usefulness of the signal. A summary
of the experiments performed is detailed in Table V.
TABLE V
PORT SCAN EXPERIMENTS
Experiment Signal Types Safe Signal to CSM Weight
1 danger & safe -1
2 danger, safe & PAMP -1
3 danger, safe & PAMP -2
4 danger, safe, PAMP -2
& inflammation
VI. PORT SCAN RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
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Fig. 4. The mean % mature antigen derived for each process of interest,
shown for each signal combination.
In experiment 1, all process IDs presented as antigen
are analysed and a mean percentage mature antigen value
(% mAg) is calculated. The results in Table VI show that
although antigen is presented for numerous sshd processes,
negligible amounts are detected as dangerous. Similar values
are found for experiments 2, 3 and 4 and thus the sshd
child processes are omitted from the corresponding results
TABLE VI
TWO SIGNALS (EXPT 1)
Process Name Num antigen Mean % mAg Std Dev
ssh script 10.4 0 0
sshd -p 2222 31.9 0 0
sshd:jqg[priv] 246.2 0 0.002
sshd:jqg[net] 26.7 0 0
sshd:jqg[pam] 10.4 0 0
bash 293.6 0.205 0.159
sshd jqg@pts/8 476.0 0.437 0.090
nmap -sP 3536.4 0.843 0.069
X forward agt 471.7 0.297 0.115
scp blufire.ai 285.3 0.378 0.157
TABLE VII
THREE SIGNALS WITH -1 SAFE SIGNAL WEIGHTING (EXPT 2)
Process Name Mean % mAg Standard Deviation
bash 0.212 0.152
sshd jqg@pts/8 0.441 0.159
nmap -sP 0.910 0.0456
X forward agt 0.421 0.176
scp blufire.ai 0.428 0.187
tables, Tables VII, VIII and IX respectively. The tables show
the mean percentage mature antigen for each process in
addition to the standard deviation from the mean, found to be
reflective of the actual data distribution. The five processes
of interest presented in Figure 4 include: the bash shell
from which the scan was performed; the ssh demon; the
nmap performing the port scan; the graphical forwarding
agent for the remote shell; and the file transfer (scp). The
scp file transfer provides us with a baseline comparison. If
the DCA works correctly, nmap is expected to produce a
significantly greater mean % mature antigen than the file
transfer. Indeed, analysis of data from all experiments shows
that nmap produces significantly greater mean % mature
antigen than the baseline normal file transfer (see Table X),
especially in experiment 3. This is true for any combination
of signals. Furthermore, the mean % mature antigen for the
normal file transfer is significantly reduced when the safe
signal weight is changed to -2. All significance are assessed
through paired t-tests, with 95% confidence demonstrated.
A. Analysis
In each experiment the nmap process generates signific-
antly more mature context antigen than any other process,
as shown through the paired t-test results given in Table
X. The standard deviations of these results are within an
acceptable range indicating that all means are representative
of the sample. The good detection rate of the anomalous
process indicates that the DCA may be suitable as a general
purpose anomaly detector. The addition of PAMPs does not
significantly increase the detection of the ‘anomalous’ nmap
(p > 0.05), but combined with a higher safe signal weight,
significantly lowers the % mature antigen value of the normal
processes. This implies that in future experiments a much
higher level of safe signal can be used without reducing
the detection of the misbehaving process. This in turn may
reduce the amount of false positives in comparison with
TABLE VIII
THREE SIGNALS WITH -2 WEIGHT (EXPT 3)
Process Name Mean % mAg Standard Deviation
bash 0.107 0.115
sshd jqg@pts/8 0.271 0.077
nmap -sP 0.829 0.083
X forward agt 0.172 0.203
scp blufire.ai 0.176 0.196
TABLE IX
FOUR SIGNALS (EXPT 4)
Process Name Mean % mAg Standard Deviation
bash 0.103 0.054
sshd jqg@pts/8 0.423 0.121
nmap -sP 0.796 0.139
X forward agt 0.319 0.160
scp blufire.ai 0.348 0.227
previous AIS intrusion detection systems.
It is also interesting to note that the inclusion of inflammat-
ory signals in experiment 4 produces an increase in the de-
tection of the normal process (0.348 %mAg) when compared
to experiment 3 (0.176 %mAg). On closer inspection of the
output data we discovered that fewer antigen are presented
per DC (0.25 antigen per DC) versus 0.42 antigen per DC in
all three previous experiments. Two implications are evident
from these results: First, DCs spend a shorter time in the
tissue as the CSM threshold is exceeded at twice the rate;
second, as the DC spend less time in the tissue, less antigen
is collected. This is analogous to the effects of inflammation
in the human immune system.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this paper we have demonstrated the use of a Dend-
ritic Cell inspired Algorithm (DCA) on two datasets. The
results from the Wisconsin Breast Cancer experiments have
validated the use of the algorithm within the libtissue
framework. The promising results shown in the port scan
experiments imply that the DCA plus the libtissue frame-
work can be used for the purpose of anomaly detection under
real-time conditions.
Future work includes the incorporation of the replay client
outlined in Section III. This client will allow us to collect
more data of our choice, and to study the behaviour of
the DCA in detail. Sensitivity analysis performed using the
replay client will give us greater understanding of the DCA,
necessary before any further development of the algorithm. A
suitable method of comparison with other anomaly detection
techniques is also under investigation. Ultimately, we would
like to apply this data to real-time system monitoring to
detect exploits, botnets or scanning worms. Results from this
will assist in deriving an answer to the original question[4]:
is Danger Theory the missing link between AIS and IDS?
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